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Abstract
As industrial civilization confronts the devastating consequences of 
global climate change, the difficult choices surrounding its solutions 
have only become more complicated following the election of 
President Donald Trump and his recent declaration of intent to 
exit the Paris Climate Accord. This paper analyzes whether China 
is prepared and credible to fill the void left by the US. Specifically, 
whether China’s domestic climate mitigation efforts are sufficient 
to demonstrate willingness and capability to be the world’s climate 
policy leader. This article ultimately determines that China is both 
ready and willing to act as the preeminent climate power, despite 
imperfections in domestic energy and environmental policy.
Introduction
China emits more greenhouse gases (GHGs) than any other country 
on the planet. However, China may also become the world’s next 
climate leader. With the election of Donald Trump, many analysts 
speculate that the United States may downsize its role in climate 
negotiations in the near future. Faced with this reality, it is critical 
to determine whether China’s domestic efforts to combat climate 
change legitimize its global ambitions to lead the rest of the world 
in doing the same. As China attempts to fill the power vacuum 
left by the United States and improve its standing relative to the 
rest of the world on global warming initiatives, domestic Chinese 
climate policies will be scrutinized by competitors and followers to 
determine the efficacy of China’s strategy.
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 Some argue that China’s domestic efforts are imperfect, yet 
do indicate a willingness and capacity to address climate change by 
promoting renewable development and by its eagerness to participate 
in international climate agreements. Contrarians posit that China is 
unable to effectively lead global action to reduce emissions because of 
its continued reliance on fossil fuels domestically while fighting against 
binding emissions restrictions under international frameworks. There is 
robust data on both sides, and it is difficult to conclude that one position 
or the other is completely correct. However, the stronger argument is 
that countries are willing to accept China as the climate action leader 
because most states recognize that China has taken sufficient action to 
demonstrate a commitment to the problem of global warming, even if 
China has not solved its own fossil fuel addiction.
Literature Review
 Those in favor of the idea that China’s domestic climate efforts 
legitimize its leadership goals generally present two core arguments: 
China is the global leader in renewable energy and China is the global 
leader in climate agreements. Falkner cites China’s 2014 investment 
of 83.3 billion USD in renewable energy as particularly significant 
being that it was the largest ever investment in alternative energy in 
a single year.1 In addition, China has ramped up solar-cell production 
from 50 megawatts to 23,000 in less than ten years.2 Li et al. forward 
a similar argument by citing specific programs the central government 
has formulated: the China Renewable Energy Development Program 
and China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program have both been 
tremendous successes and have put Chinese-manufactured renewables 
on the cutting-edge of global energy development.3 These investments 
and programs are particularly important for determining China’s 
leadership capacity because they have focused on promoting export 
capacity which can be an effective way to disseminate technology and 
influence other countries.
 Proponents also defend China’s domestic efforts based on 
China’s willingness to establish linkages with other actors. Falkner 
argues that the bilateral agreement negotiated in 2014 between the 
1  Falkner, Robert, “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International 
Climate Politics,” International Affairs 92 no. 5 (2016): 1112. 
2  Falkner, Robert, “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate 
Politics,” International Affairs 92 no. 5 (2016): 1113.
3  Hu, Biliang, Jia Luo, Chunlai Chen, and Bingqin Li, “Evaluating China’s Low-carbon 
Cities,” East Asia Forum. N.p., 06 (September 2016): 740.
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United States and China was the single most important climate deal 
ever. This was not only because it brought the issue of climate change 
to the forefront of each country’s respective political discourse, but 
also because it was critical in paving the way for the success of the 
Paris agreement that would follow a year later.4 The goal to lead the 
world in climate action is also tied to China’s foreign policy priority 
of avoiding international ridicule.5 Li et al. argue that one of the major 
motivations for China to develop a domestic emissions-trading scheme 
is to eventually be able to link it with the European Union’s cap-and-
trade and lead the developing countries wing of emissions trading.6 
While these arguments posit that China’s domestic efforts as a strong 
foundation for international leadership tend to focus on the overarching 
goals and general trends, arguments against this position tend to focus 
on the specific details of emissions and policy.
 Aldy and Pizer argue that China cannot be a top climate 
leader until its emissions are under control. They cite that total Chinese 
emissions have grown 250% since 1997, Chinese emissions intensity is 
five times that of the United States, and that Chinese coal consumption 
continues to grow rapidly while US and EU rates fall.7 This study uses 
absolute emissions totals and chooses not to account for population 
growth. Although the energy intensity of growth accounts for rising 
incomes, the significance of the combined influence of income, 
population, and technology will be explored later in this paper.
 In addition to the statistically driven critique of China’s 
potential international leadership role, Godement reasons that 
China is not fit to lead the international community because of its 
opposition to binding international agreements.8 Although China has 
played a proactive role in negotiating climate agreements, the 2008 
financial crisis exposed potential weaknesses in the Chinese economy, 
prompting CCP leaders to be more cautious regarding measures that 
could threaten growth. Godement argues that China has pushed its 
4  Falkner, Robert, “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate 
Politics,” International Affairs 92 no. 5 (2016): 1114.
5  Hu, Biliang, Jia Luo, Chunlai Chen, and Bingqin Li, “Evaluating China’s Low-carbon 
Cities,” East Asia Forum. N.p., 06 (September 2016): 709.
6  Ibid.
7  Aldy, Joseph, and William Pizer, “Alternative Metrics for Comparing Domestic 
Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy 
Architecture,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10, no. 1 (2016): 9.
8  Godement, Francoi, “EXPANDED AMBITIONS, SHRINKING ACHIEVEMENTS: 
HOW CHINA SEES THE GLOBAL ORDER,” EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (2017): 4.
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domestic growth agenda ahead of and onto its foreign climate agenda, 
making it less ambitious and more flexible which is mirrored in 
agreements like COP21, also known as the Paris accords.9 The precise 
nature of international agreements is an important arena to explore 
because these deals operate as the nexus at which foreign policy 
negotiation and domestic policy implementation either reinforce 
or weaken one another. 
Analysis
 This section will focus on justifying the claim that China’s 
domestic climate policy does legitimize its international leadership 
efforts. However, there is one implicit assumption that must be 
thought through first: can domestic efforts legitimize international 
leadership efforts in the first place? The answer to this question is 
also yes.
 There are several reasons why domestic efforts are critical 
to international ones, so each will be discussed only briefly in the 
next few paragraphs. First, Chinese decisionmakers and the Chinese 
public must be convinced that particular solutions work before they 
are willing to risk their political livelihoods and international image 
on their results.10 With this in mind, the domestic arena acts as a 
laboratory and training ground for such solutions. Second, Chinese 
leaders have tried to frame the country’s ascendance to a position 
of global leadership around its intention to be a “responsible great 
power.”11 Climate has become the ultimate area of ‘responsibility’ on 
the international stage. As a result, China’s climate action has become 
a litmus test of this promise. 
Striving to be a responsible great power is a component of 
a larger foreign policy goal: to avoid international ridicule.12 China 
has been roundly criticized by many Western powers for not doing 
enough to curb its emissions. This criticism has generated a fear among 
Chinese leaders that a negative perception of the Chinese government 
may ‘spill back’ to influence Chinese public opinion.13 Using climate 
9  Ibid.
10  Hallding, Karl, Guoyi Han, and Marie Olsson, “A Balancing Act: China’s Role in 
Climate Change,” The Commission on Sustainable Development (2009): 98.
11  Hallding, Karl, Guoyi Han, and Marie Olsson, “A Balancing Act: China’s Role in 
Climate Change,” The Commission on Sustainable Development (2009): 104.
12  Hu, Biliang, Jia Luo, Chunlai Chen, and Bingqin Li, “Evaluating China’s Low-carbon 
Cities,” East Asia Forum. N.p., 06 (September 2016): 709.
13  Ibid.
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action as an opportunity to demonstrate that China is a responsible 
power, committed to a rules-based order would go a long way towards 
silencing critics and promoting Chinese leadership.14
 In order to complete this argument, it is necessary to consider 
whether the relationship between Chinese domestic climate efforts and 
international ones is both necessary and sufficient. This would mean 
that an absence of effective domestic policy would make international 
leadership impossible (thus making domestic efforts necessary) and that 
the presence of robust domestic climate action would be sufficient to 
legitimize Chinese leadership. It is almost undoubtedly true that if China 
were to take no domestic action, it could not lead parallel international 
efforts. However, the question investigated herein is the threshold for 
that action. Godement argues that one of the critical factors holding 
back Chinese climate leadership is the internationally perceived lack 
of domestic follow through.15 By this argument and those above, it 
seems that domestic efforts are a necessary prerequisite to international 
leadership. Yet, it is difficult to make the case that domestic efforts - on 
their own - are a sufficient condition for international leadership. There 
are many variables that factor into whether a particular country follows 
another on a particular issue, but in the case of China, many of those 
alternative factors – leadership void, growing global interdependence, 
et cetera – are also trending in favor of climate leadership. With these 
conditions, it appears that domestic policy can act as a sufficient 
foundation for global leadership.16
 Having provided a basis for the assumption that domestic 
climate policy has a bearing on global leadership initiatives, there are 
two subdivisions that can be made regarding the influence of domestic 
policy: practical and perceived. Practical considerations regarding 
domestic climate policy include calculations such as whether emissions 
are increasing or decreasing, the energy intensity of growth, and so on. 
The perceived impact of domestic efforts deals with whether countries 
believe China is a climate leader, regardless of the effectiveness of their 
action.
14  Preston, Felix, “China Is Well Positioned to Take on the Green Mantle,” The World 
Today (2017): 21.
15  Godement, Francoi, “EXPANDED AMBITIONS, SHRINKING ACHIEVEMENTS: 
HOW CHINA SEES THE GLOBAL ORDER,” EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (2017): 7.
16  Preston, Felix, “China Is Well Positioned to Take on the Green Mantle,” The World 
Today (2017): 21.
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 It is undeniable that Chinese emissions are the largest single 
source of greenhouse gases and are increasing. Precisely how the issue 
is framed can make the Chinese central government seem more or less 
culpable. As explained in the arguments section, Aldy and Pizer focus 
on cumulative emissions. From this perspective, it is clear that Chinese 
emissions are only climbing higher and are the source of a massive 
portion of global greenhouse gases. 
 
 
However, when analyzing per-capita GHG trends, it is a different story.  
From this alternative view, Chinese emissions are increasing, 
but remain only a fraction of American and Russian emissions while 
being roughly equivalent to those of the EU. Moreover, it is important 
to consider factors that impact emissions such as affluence and 
population. The idea that environmental impact is, basically, a function 
of population, affluence, and technology is relatively well accepted 
in both environmental science and policy-making circles because it 
accurately describes complex environmental problems while collapsing 
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that complexity into just a few digestible variables.17 Although there 
are criticisms of this model for its lack of specificity in the context of 
specific environmental issues, it is useful for describing broad trends 
over time.
I = PAT or IPAT
Environmental impact = population x affluence x technology
With IPAT in mind, not only do per capita emissions become more 
relevant, but population growth and affluence (income and wealth) trends 
as well. Total population growth rates are somewhat sporadic for some 
countries, but in the case of China, there is a smooth downward trend. 
 
This population stabilization should make it easier for China 
to get a handle on its pollution because energy expansion can be 
built out predictably by renewable sources that take longer to fund 
and construct rather than by coal plants that spring up to meet rapidly 
increasing demand. Considering aggregate population trends in tandem 
with urbanization rates is key to effectively scrutinize emissions because 
higher levels of urbanization generally produce lower emissions.18 This 
reduction is likely to be amplified in China as the central government 
increasingly pushes localities to plan megacities in a low-carbon, 
sustainable fashion.19 Overall urbanization trends show that while many 
industrialized countries and even developing nations like India are 
17  Ehrlich, Paul, “Human Impact: The Ethics of I=PAT,” ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 14 (2014): 11.
18  Creutzig, Felix, Giovanni Baiocchi, and Robert Bierkandt, “Global Typology of 
Urban Energy Use and Potentials for an Urbanization Mitigation Wedge,” PNAS 112 
no. 20 (2013): 6286.
19  Hu, Biliang, Jia Luo, Chunlai Chen, and Bingqin Li, “Evaluating China’s Low-carbon 
Cities,” East Asia Forum. N.p., 06 (September 2016): 755.
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slowly becoming more urban, China’s urban population is growing at 
a rapid pace. 
This rural to urban migration inevitably strains resources and 
puts stress on municipal infrastructure, including energy utilities, to 
provide for the rapidly growing population. As such, emissions may 
increase in the interim, but it is a boon for climate action down the 
road. These urbanization trends suggest that most developed countries 
do eventually stabilize at a particular level of urbanization, and this 
stabilization is likely to occur in China as well. Once the transition is 
over and city planners can rework some basic systems, there is likely to 
be a drastic reduction in emissions.
 Affluence must also be considered to determine the full 
impact of population. Emissions are likely to remain low despite a large 
population if that population is generally impoverished, as was the case 
in China some time ago and in India more recently. Or, there can be 
a smaller group that earns much more and emits according to their 
ability to consume, as in the case of the United States. GDP per capita 
indicates that although Chinese GDP has grown at unprecedented rates 
over the last two decades, the average Chinese income is still much 
lower than the American or European income. 
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This represents a threat to climate action and a potential argument to 
project ballooning Chinese emissions: there is still a high ceiling on 
wealth and, in turn, emissions. However, data about the energy intensity 
of growth shows that while Chinese growth remains relatively energy 
intensive, it is a dramatic decline from just two decades ago and the 
trend continues to point downward. Energy intensity is a measure 
of how much energy is required to produce a given unit of growth. 
This exposes an error in Aldy and Pizer’s analysis: they simply 
consider Chinese growth intensity relative to the US, but fail to account 
for how high that intensity has been and how low it could get the future. 
Less energy-intensive growth can mitigate the impact of an increasingly 
wealthy population by decoupling that wealth from emissions. The 
trend toward fewer emissions per dollar of purchasing power has yet 
to level off and is likely to continue as China develops a more robust 
renewables capacity, the technological factor in IPAT.
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 Perhaps the most promising trend in Chinese domestic policy 
is the increasing growth of renewable energy. In absolute terms, China 
has the largest capacity of solar and wind projects of any country in the 
world.20 Global renewables data show that as many actors stagnate in 
their adoption of renewables, China continues to expand its renewable 
use – nearly keeping pace with the EU. 
Although this graph is promising for China’s prospects as a 
climate leader, figure 8 presents the opposite. This figure shows the 
clearest difference between actors of any graph presented: China’s coal 
consumption remains sky-high. Despite its best efforts and burgeoning 
renewables, China cannot seem to substantially reduce its coal 
consumption. 
Although this curve has begun to level off and even dip, it is 
unlikely that China’s consumption will sink to levels comparable with 
20  Hilton, Isabel, “With Trump, China Emerges As Global Leader on Climate,” Yale 
E360. Yale University, 21 Nov. 2016.
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the other countries presented any time soon. The question then becomes 
whether these levels of coal consumption restrain China’s ability to 
become a climate leader. While it will invariably be criticized, China’s 
coal consumption is not sufficiently limiting to prevent its climate rise.
 One of the factors mediating international perception of 
China’s thirst for coal is the difference in exports between Chinese coal 
and alternative energy. Brazil has produced 90 percent or more of its 
electricity from renewable sources for over twenty years, but Brazil has 
not led a global effort to adopt low-carbon energy because its model of 
hydroelectric power is not universally replicable and Brazilian industry 
has struggled to export their innovations. For this same reason, China’s 
renewable development is comparatively more influential than its coal 
consumption: while China is the leading exporter in renewable energy, 
it is a net importer of coal.21 This means that the question of whether 
China is “green” or not is a matter of international perception. If China 
were a poor marketer, there is certainly enough evidence to make the 
case that Chinese climate leadership would represent hypocrisy, but if 
China is able to influence the interpretation of its energy consumption, 
then its alternative energy development can be emphasized.
 The statistical discussion above should give the impression 
that China has a compelling case to be a climate leader, but it is not 
without fallacies. Despite having the highest levels of coal consumption 
in the world by far, China also has the highest level of renewables 
investment22, the highest levels of renewables exports23, and the highest 
level of solar and wind manufacturing and installations.24 This has been 
produced by a commitment to international agreements and domestic 
policy that promote the growth of renewables such as COP21 and the 
Chinese emissions trading scheme.25 This policy suite of technological 
advancement, international agreements, and market-based approaches 
has given China at least the image of being one of the most innovative 
21  Matthews, John and Hao Tan, China’s Renewable Energy Revolution, London: 
Palgrave-MacMillan, (2014): 27.
22  Werber, Cassie. “The World’s Biggest Polluter Is Now the Global Leader in 
Renewable-energy Spending.” Quartz,  18 Mar. 2016.
23  Matthews, John and Hao Tan, China’s Renewable Energy Revolution, London: 
Palgrave-MacMillan, (2014): 80.
24  Hilton, Isabel, “With Trump, China Emerges As Global Leader on Climate,” Yale 
E360. Yale University, 21 Nov. 2016.
25  Hu, Biliang, Jia Luo, Chunlai Chen, and Bingqin Li, “Evaluating China’s Low-carbon 
Cities,” East Asia Forum. N.p., 06 (September 2016): 709.
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climate leaders.26
These policies and agreements were discussed earlier, but 
it is essential to consider them again in the context of international 
perception. Although Godement and others forward legitimate critiques 
regarding the implementation of these programs, these criticisms are only 
meaningful if there are preferable alternatives. In other words, if binding 
agreements were the norm, it is far more likely that China’s resistance to 
such restrictions would damage Chinese leadership credibility. But that 
is not the plane on which status quo climate politics operates. Instead, 
countries with concern for climate change are looking for what Hallding 
refers to as “two minimals.”27 The purpose of China’s domestic climate 
effort is not to build the world a silver bullet, but to demonstrate that the 
most coal-intensive, fastest-growing developing economy in the world 
can take climate action too. By demonstrating some level of commitment 
to climate action through domestic policy, other states can be provided 
the “assurance that China is sufficiently ‘in’ for there to be a realistic 
chance of containing global emissions.”28 In so doing, China can act as 
the global leader to build trust and bridge the gap between developing 
and developed economies to begin to resolve the ultimate first mover 
problem that is climate change.
Conclusion
 Combatting global climate change is a collective action problem 
that will require global coordination and leadership. China is well 
positioned to take on the position of global climate leader as determined 
by analyzing both objective and perceived metrics. Chinese emissions 
will begin to level off and decline in the future as urban populations 
grow and growth intensity continues to fall. However, this does not mean 
that Chinese domestic climate policy is clearly a success. There are still 
many measures by which China lags behind the rest of the world, namely, 
its increasing coal consumption. Yet it is because of China’s importance 
and complexity that foreign countries are likely to look to China as the 
global climate leader based commitment to climate policy domestically, 
despite imperfections. Future research should track the United States’ 
26  Rock, Michael T., and Michael A. Toman, China’s Technological Catch-up Strategy 
Industrial Development, Energy Efficiency, and CO2 Emissions, (New York: Oxford UP, 
2015): 71.
27  Hallding, Karl, Guoyi Han, and Marie Olsson, “A Balancing Act: China’s Role in 
Climate Change,” The Commission on Sustainable Development (2009): 105.
28  Hallding, Karl, Guoyi Han, and Marie Olsson, “A Balancing Act: China’s Role in 
Climate Change,” The Commission on Sustainable Development (2009): 105.
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international climate influence as the Trump administration’s agenda 
takes shape and should pay special attention to China’s actions at the 
2017 Boston climate summit. Moreover, the trends observed in the 
figures of this paper should continue to be tracked given that the basic 
factors of population, affluence, and technology are likely to decisive in 
determining emissions levels.
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Figures 
 Below are larger versions of the figures in the text with source 
information. A brief note: 1990 was chosen as the base year because 
that was the earliest year for which all data sets were available. Brazil 
was not included in figure 7 because its incredibly high levels skewed 
the visual and made it difficult to distinguish the rest of the curves 
along the lower part of the graph. I chose to analyze the US, EU, and 
BRICS because data on those actors was consistently available across 
all data sets. These actors also represent the most influential states, a 
collection of many of the largest emitters, and a balance of developed 
and developing economies. Axis titles and each figure’s use in the text 
should make clear the purpose of each graph. All data was accessed by 
myself through the publicly available websites noted in parentheses.
Figure 1 (Source: World Resources Institute CAIT Tool)
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Figure 2 (Source: World Resources Institute CAIT Tool)
 
Figure 3 (Source: World Bank Population Statistics)  
Figure 4 (Source: World Bank Population Statistics)
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Figure 5 (Source: World Bank Income Statistics)
Figure 6 (Source: EnerData Energy Yearbook)
Figure 7 (Source: EnerData Energy Yearbook)
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Figure 8 (Source: EnerData Energy Yearbook)
